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This paper reviews recent aspects of my research. It focuses, ﬁrst, on the idea that during the percep-
tion of objects and people, action-based representations are automatically activated and, second, that
such action representations can feed back and inﬂuence the perception of people and objects. For
example, when one is merely viewing an object such as a coffee cup, the action it affords, such as a
reach to grasp, is activated even though there is no intention to act on the object. Similarly, when
one is observing a person’s behaviour, their actions are automatically simulated, and such action
simulation can inﬂuence our perception of the person and the object with which they interacted.
The experiments to be described investigate the role of attention in such vision-to-action processes,
the effects of such processes on emotion, and the role of a perceiver’s body state in their interpretation
of visual stimuli.
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There is an increasing appreciation for the intimate
link between vision and action: that vision’s
primary role is to serve action and that action
states of the body inﬂuence our understanding of
the visual world. As Gibson (1979) noted,
sensory systems speciﬁcally evolved to serve
action, to allow an animal to interact with its
environment. From running across an uneven
surface to escape a predator, to climbing a tree to
grasp an apple, vision provides information about
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2010, 63 (11), 2081–2105the actions objects afford. Hence a major role of
vision is to extract information that determines
how the body can interact with the object: A
small round-shaped apple affords grasping by the
hand, a chair affords sitting, and steps afford foot
responses to climb.
There is now substantial evidence that this con-
version from vision into action is automatic, taking
place even when a person has no intentions to act
on a viewed object (see Tipper, 2004, for a review).
For example, Tucker and Ellis (1998) showed that
merely viewing an object that affords an action
appears to activate that action. Thus, seeing a
coffee cup activates the motor responses to grasp
the cup, even though at no time is it necessary to
actually grasp the cup. Such results support the
notion that we represent our world primarily as
opportunities for action (see Bub & Masson, in
press, for boundary conditions).
This automatic conversion from vision to action
also takes place, not just when looking at inani-
mate objects that can be acted upon, but also
when viewing other people’s actions. The discov-
ery of mirror neurones (di Pellegrino, Fadiga,
Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992) promoted
this notion. Cells in ventral premotor cortex area
F5 respond when an animal grasps an object in a
particular manner. Importantly, however, the
same cell will respond when the monkey sees
another individual produce the same action.
Thus the same neural system encodes the
animal’s own actions and responds when it
observes another’s action. It has been proposed
that these mapping processes from other to self
provide one means of understanding other
people, by representing their actions as actions
we could perform ourselves.
There is now extensive evidence that in humans
this automatic simulation of another person’s
actions is a widespread phenomenon (e.g.,
Blakemore & Decety, 2001). For example, when
seeing another person make a gaze shift to a par-
ticular location, our own attention systems and
eye-movements make the same response, orienting
our attention to the same location or object of
interest (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998).
Similarly, when we view a person smiling or
frowning, we simulate the emotion expressed.
That is, the face muscles associated with the
emotion, such as the zygomaticus major cheek
muscle when smiling and the corrugator supercilii
brow muscle when frowning or angry, become
automatically active in the person observing these
emotions in someone else (e.g., Cannon, Hayes,
& Tipper, 2009; Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998;
Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). Finally,
more extensive body actions such as grasping an
object with the hands, or kicking an object such
as a ball, also appear to be automatically simulated
when they are viewed (e.g., Bach & Tipper, 2007;
Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000;
Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz,
2001).
It is believed that these simulation processes
may be a foundation of empathy, because they
allow a viewer to experience another person’s
bodily states as if they were their own. The percep-
tion of another’s pain is probably one of the clear-
est examples of how empathy may be achieved via
simulations. For example, we all have experienced
the emotional distress when we observe another
person’s injury, such as a child’s ﬁnger trapped in
a closing door. When experiencing pain, areas of
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior
insula appear to encode the emotional aspects of
the pain, whereas somatosensory areas seem to
encode its physical aspects. Interestingly, when
one is observing someone else’s body receive
painful stimulation such as a pin-prick (e.g.,
Morrison, Lloyd, di Pellegrino, & Roberts,
2004), or the knowledge that a loved one is receiv-
ing pain (e.g., Singer et al., 2004), the same areas
of ACC and insula are active. However, we
(Morrison, Tipper, Adams, & Bach, 2010) have
recently provided some evidence that a highly
speciﬁc region of somatosensory area SII is also
activated when a hand is seen to grasp a noxious
object, such as a broken glass or lit match (see
Figure 1). Hence empathy for others’ pain
appears to rely on simulations of the emotional
and physical aspects of the stimulus experience.
In the examples above there is a direct relation-
ship between the visual stimulus and an action.
Thus viewing the coffee cup affords grasping,
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and saccade, viewing kicking of a ball activates
similar actions in the observer’s motor system,
and viewing painful injury activates emotion and
somatosensory areas. However, it seems that the
activation of motor systems when processing
visual stimuli is even more extensive than was
ﬁrst thought. We have recently provided examples
where the action system of a person can be acti-
vated even when a visual stimulus has no obvious
action properties: that is, when viewing a face or
a nonaction word.
In one task we required participants to identify
pairs of faces with either a foot key-press or a ﬁnger
key-press. The faces clearly have no properties that
could bias response of the hand versus the foot;
likewise the use of motor responses with the
hand or foot would not normally inﬂuence our
ability to identify a face. However, when the
faces to be identiﬁed were famous athletes whose
special skill was associated with the foot, such as
soccer player Wayne Rooney, and with the hand,
such as tennis player Tim Henman, then motor
compatibility effects were observed (see Figure 2).
Thus even identifying a face can automatically acti-
vate motor-based representations associated with
unrelated parts of the body (Bach & Tipper, 2006).
We found similar results when viewing words
with no obvious action properties. For example, in
one condition the task might require participants
to lift their ﬁngers from response keys and make a
square movement with both hands to report
whether the word denoted an object that was
found in the house (e.g., television), or a round/cir-
cular-shaped movement to report whether the
object would be found outside the house (e.g.,
moon). The top panel of Figure 3 shows the
instruction screen used to guide participants in
Figure 2. These are some examples of the face stimuli presented in Bach and Tipper (2006). For this particular participant a ﬁnger key-press
was required to identify the tennis player Greg Rusedksi (action compatible) and the soccer player Michael Owen (response incompatible),
while a foot response was necessary to identify the tennis player Tim Henman (response incompatible) and the soccer player Wayne
Rooney (response compatible). The images of Rusedski, Owen, Henman and Rooney were courtesy of Les Miller, Michael Kjaer, Andrew
Haywood and Gordon Flood respectively.
Figure 1. Partly inﬂated cortical surface showing selective
activation in left SII when viewing a hand approaching and
grasping or withdrawing from a noxious pain-inducing object.
Red is activation encoding noxious objects independent of whether
they are grasped or not; yellow is the area encoding whether the
object is grasped or not independent of the kind of object; and of
most importance, green is a region activated when observing the
speciﬁc action of grasping a noxious/painful object. Note also the
activity in midcingulate cortex (MCC) in this last condition of
grasping a noxious object, an area previously implicated in coding
affective components of pain observation.
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FROM OBSERVATION TO ACTION SIMULATIONthis somewhat unusual motor response. Although
the shape of the object was irrelevant to the
indoor/outdoor task, it nevertheless appeared to
evoke action-based representations that inﬂuenced
motor responses. Thus, while making a round
shape action to report that an object is found
outside the house, the reaction time (RT) to start
the action and the movement time (MT) to com-
plete the action were fast, and the trajectory
describing the round shape was accurate (see the
middle Panel of Figure 3), when the object’s
shape was round, such as the word “moon”. Incon-
trast, RT and MT were slow, and hand path was
disrupted when the object possessed a square
shape, such as the word “billboard” (bottom panel
of Figure 3). Hence, even though these words rep-
resentobjects thatdonotevokeanaction,semantic
decisions nevertheless can interact with motor
systems in some circumstances.
The research reviewed above indicates that
embodiment processes, where our own body
states are involved in representing the world
around us, are widespread. In the following I
discuss some of the research we have undertaken
to further understand the processes that convert
vision to action states: ﬁrst, how these processes
are guided by attention; second, how another
person’s eye-gaze is represented; third, how
action simulations contribute to our emotional
attitude toward objects and people we interact
with; and fourth, how we use action simulations
to understand other people. The core idea is that
vision can evoke action automatically in many situ-
ations and that these evoked action states can in
turn feed back and inﬂuence perceptual process.
For example, perceiving a person produce an
action can activate similar action states in the
observer, which facilitates or inhibits the observer’s
own subsequent action; subsequently, this ﬂuency
of the observer’s own action can then inﬂuence
how the observed person or object is represented.
How attention inﬂuences the conversion of
perception into action
One of the issues that we have been involved in has
been to better specify the role of attention in the
Figure 3. The top panel shows the action instructions for
participants. For this person they are required to make round
shape actions when the word describes an outside object, and a
square shaped action when the word describes an object typically
found in a house. The lower panels depict examples of path
trajectories. In these examples participants made a round action to
report an object was found outside the house. The middle panel
shows compatible trials where the object (e.g., moon) has a round
shape, and a round action is produced. The bottom panel shows
incompatible trials where the object has a square shape (e.g.,
billboard) while the round hand action is produced. Notice that in
the compatible conditions the circle trajectories are more accurate
(and reaction time, RT, to start and movement time, MT, to
complete the action are fast), whereas in the incompatible
conditions the shape of the object intrudes into the shape of the
motor response to be produced (and RT and MT are slow). To
view a colour version of this ﬁgure, please see the online issue of
the Journal.
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TIPPERprocesses that convert vision into action. As noted,
itseemstheconversionfromvisiontoactionisauto-
matic, in the sense that this process takes place even
when an individual has no intentions of acting on
the viewed stimulus. However, when we interact
with complex environments in an effort to achieve
speciﬁc goals, it is critical that our actions are
directed towards the correct object at the appropri-
ate moment in time. Therefore selection processes
have evolved to enable sequential goal-directed be-
haviour. Allowing highly efﬁcient vision-to-action
processes to run to completion without selection
processes would result in chaotic behaviour, where
the strongest stimulus of the moment would
capture and direct our actions. For example, when
attempting to reach for my coffee cup, an irrelevant
cup closer and ipsilateral to my hand could easily
capture my action (Tipper, Lortie, & Baylis,
1992). One way in which attention could guide
these processes would be by either enhancing or
suppressing processing of the particular stimulus
features that afford action.
As an initial investigation of the role of atten-
tion, we adapted the procedure of Tucker and
Ellis (1998). As a reminder, Tucker and Ellis
showed that even though the action evoked by the
object was irrelevant to the task, this appeared to
be encoded and inﬂuenced the speed of response.
Thus if an object was oriented such that the right
hand would be normally used to grasp it, right-
hand key-press responses were facilitated.
In our task, a door handle was presented to the
centre of the computer screen (see Figure 4 for
examples). Objects such as these automatically
evoke action responses. For example, when these
stimuli are viewed a right-hand grasp would be
evoked, and when handles oriented in the opposite
direction are viewed a left-hand response would be
evoked. Previous studies have demonstrated that
such response compatibility effects have been pro-
duced when participants decide whether the stimu-
lus is normally oriented or inverted, or whether it is
a kitchen or garage object, for example. Note that
during these decision processes object shape must
be analysed during the process of object recog-
nition, and an object’s shape is of course relevant
to grasping actions. Therefore we wanted to see
whether automatic vision-to-action processes also
take place when attention is oriented towards a
stimulus dimension that is unrelated to action
(Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006).
In our study we manipulated the object property
thatparticipantshadtoreport.Inoneconditionthey
had to report whether the handle had a square (e.g.,
Figure 4, Panel A) or rounded (e.g., Figure 4, Panel
B) shape with left and right key-press responses.
Because shape has a direct relationship with
action, in that it determines the form of the hand
as it grasps an object, clear stimulus–response com-
patibility effects were expected, and these were
observed. In a second condition, while looking at
the same displays participants were required to
report the colour of the door handles. Colour of
course is unrelated to action, in that whether a
handle is blue (Panel A) or green (Panel B) will
not affect the reach-to-grasp processes. And
indeed, in this condition of colour identiﬁcation
the action affordance stimulus–response compat-
ibility effects were signiﬁcantly reduced.
Therefore such a result shows that even though
vision-to-action processes are automatic, this is not
what might be viewed as a strong form of automa-
ticity. They depend on action-affording stimulus
features being in the focus of attention. This
suggests that one way in which attention can
control ongoing behaviour is by either enhancing
or suppressing the action-affording stimulus
features. This was further conﬁrmed in a study
where the actions of another person were observed.
Bach, Peatﬁeld, and Tipper (2007) required
Figure 4. Examples of the door handles used in Tipper et al. (2006).
These handles evoke right-hand grasps; on other trials the handles
were mirror reversed, evoking left-hand grasps. Exactly the same
stimuli were presented to all participants: In one group they made
left and right key-presses to report whether the shape was square
(Panel A) or rounded (Panel B); another group made the same
responses to report whether the handle was blue (Panel A) or
green (Panel B). To view a colour version of this ﬁgure, please see
the online issue of the Journal.
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2010, 63 (11) 2085
FROM OBSERVATION TO ACTION SIMULATIONparticipants to report the colour of a stimulus pre-
sented on different body parts of a static image of a
viewed person. The task was to press a ﬁnger key
to identify the patch of one colour (e.g., red) and
to press a foot key to identify the other colour
(e.g., blue). These colour patches were superim-
posed on different body parts of a person under-
taking one of two actions: either kicking a soccer
ball, or typing on a keyboard. The main manipu-
lation was whether the colour was presented on a
body site related to the action, such as the hand
in the typing scene (e.g., right panel of Figure 5)
or foot in the kicking scene, or on a body site unre-
lated to action such as the head (e.g., left panel of
Figure 5).
When a participant’s attention was oriented to
the body parts related to action, compatibility
effects were produced. Thus if the colour was on
the foot kicking the ball, foot colour identiﬁcation
responses were facilitated while hand responses
were impaired, whereas if the colour was presented
on the hand in the typing scene, ﬁnger responses
were facilitated while foot responses were
impaired. In contrast, if spatial attention was
oriented towards the head, then no action compat-
ibility effects were detected, even when the person
was still seen performing the same typing or
kicking actions. Therefore, again, attention does
appear to guide the action simulation processes
by either enhancing or suppressing processing of
the action-relevant stimulus features.
It is noteworthy that in this study attending to
and reporting colour did not prevent the conver-
sion from vision into action, whereas in the study
discussed above where inanimate door handles
were viewed, attention to colour did disrupt the
effect. We propose that the simulation processes
triggered when viewing another person’s actions
are robust effects and not easily disrupted even
when attending to colour, as long as spatial atten-
tion is oriented towards the action-relevant body
site. Indeed, we also observed action priming
when the observed person was passively standing
or sitting producing no action, as long as attention
was oriented to a body site such as the foot or
hand. It is clear that orienting attention to
locations on the body has potent and wide-
ranging effects, as also reﬂected in the facilitation
of the processing of tactile stimulation on observed
body sites (e.g., Tipper et al., 1998, 2001).
In the studies described so far overt motor
responses are required—for example, pressing
keys with the ﬁngers when processing door
handles, which evoke hand responses, or ﬁnger
and foot responses when viewing scenes evoking
similar hand (typing) or foot (kicking) actions.
However, it is possible that requiring overt actions
with body parts related to viewed action (e.g.,
hand and/or foot) could feed back onto the percep-
tual processes encoding visual objects, selectively
facilitating the processing of visual stimuli related
to the action to be produced (e.g., Bub & Masson,
Figure 5. Examples of the static action images employed by Bach et al. (2007). The left panel shows a kicking action where the target (red
colour patch in this example) is presented on the non-action-related body site of the head. On other trials the blue or red colour target would be
presented on the foot. The right panel shows the typing scene where the target colour (in this example blue) was presented on the hand. In other
trials the target could be presented on the head in this display. To view a colour version of this ﬁgure, please see the online issue of the Journal.
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example, by requiring participants to make
responses by moving their foot, they become more
sensitive to visual stimuli associated with this body
part. Therefore, rather than measure behavioural
stimulus response compatibility effects, we took a
more direct measure of action processing. That is,
we measured the mu rhythm over the motor
cortex fromelectroencephalography (EEG) record-
ings in a task where no motor response was ever
required (Schuch, Bayliss, Klein, & Tipper, 2010).
The mu rhythm is activity in the alpha
frequency band (8–13 Hz) over sensorimotor
cortex. It is most pronounced when a person is at
rest and becomes suppressed during movement
production, presumably reﬂecting desynchroniza-
tion of ﬁring of neuron assemblies in the motor
system. Importantly, mu also becomes suppressed
when a person is merely observing the movement
of another person, indicating motor system acti-
vation during action observation (e.g., Gastaut &
Bert, 1954; Kilner, Marchant, & Frith, 2006;
Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004).
In our experiment, participants were required to
observe videos of a hand grasping a coffee cup.
Their task was simply to observe the video and
monitor the number of occasions that a rare event
happened. Thus during the EEG recordings no
motor response was required. Figure 6 shows the
sequence of events in typical trials. There were
two tasks: In the attend–action condition partici-
pants had to attend to the form of the action.
Most trials would be of one kind, such as a power
grip at the top of the cup, whereas a small number
of trials would be the occasional event of grasping
the cup’s handle. At the end of a block of trials
the number of these rare handle grasps was
reported. In the attend–colour condition, exactly
the same videos were viewed, but participants now
monitored the colourchangeofthe X superimposed
on the cup. For most trials the colour changed to
blue, and participants were required to report at
the end of the block the number of rare green
colour changes (of course all these conditions were
fully counterbalanced across participants).
Figure 7 shows the mu rhythm data. As can be
seen, compared to the baseline time period 1, the
mu rhythm is suppressed when participants were
merely observing an object and action (from the
periods 3 to 9). The suppression is observed not
only when participants are directly attending to
the action but also when attending to the
task-irrelevant property of colour change on
the X. Therefore this is further support for the
notion that observing another person’s actions
automatically activates the action system of the
observer (this is especially the case when action
movement is observed, as compared to observing
static images of actions: See Bach & Tipper,
2007, for contrasts between static and moving
stimuli). However, it should also be noted that
although the effect is small, there is indeed
greater mu suppression when attention is focused
on the action than when it is focused on the colour.
Unlike most studies of mu rhythms, we also
examined EEG data after the trial was completed.
Figure 6. This ﬁgure depicts a typical trial in the mu experiment. There was a baseline display for 1 s, followed by the presentation of a cup;
2.5 s later the grasp started where the hand approached the cup from the right and grasped it either at the top or by the handle. At the point of
grasp the grey X superimposed on the cup changed colour to either blue or green. Participants monitored either the colour change or the grasp
action. To view a colour version of this ﬁgure, please see the online issue of the Journal.
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TIPPERAlthough it might be assumed that little of value
can be detected during the rest period between
trials when no stimuli are presented, the model of
Houghton and Tipper (1994) makes speciﬁc pre-
dictions that can reveal the effects of attention
after stimulus offset. Because the motor system
appears to be automatically activated when one is
viewing objects and other people’s actions, there
must be inhibitory control processes that prevent
such actions from emerging as random overt beha-
viours driven by the visual environment. The cost
of failed inhibition can be seen after lesions of
the frontal lobe, where actions are continually
captured by objects and other people’s actions in
the visible scene (e.g., utilization behaviour:
Lhermitte, 1983; Luria, 1980). For example, even
though able to verbalize that no actions should
be produced, such individuals would automatically
pick up a pen on the table in front of them and start
to write.
We proposed that when attention is oriented
towards a viewed action, the internal represen-
tations are more active, and hence focusing atten-
tion on action is more likely to result in overt
behaviour. Therefore to prevent such overt
responses greater levels of inhibition will be necess-
ary when attending to action than when attending
to colour. Houghton and Tipper (1994) describe a
reactive inhibition model where the level of inhi-
bition feeding back on to the activated represen-
tations is proportional to the activation levels of
the representations. Hence greater activation
when attending to action automatically results in
greater levels of inhibitory feedback.
An important aspect of this model is that
because the level of inhibition is proportional to
the level of excitation, during stimulus processing
the network is balanced. Hence while viewing a
stimulus, there might not be a large difference
between attending to action and attending to
colour, as observed in our data. However,
somewhat counterintuitively, the model actually
predicts that after stimulus offset at the end of
the trial, the differences between attention
conditions can be more clearly revealed. This is
because upon stimulus offset the excitatory inputs
are terminated, revealing a transitory inhibitory
state that will reﬂect the level of inhibition in the
network. Thereforethis predicts that the inhibitory
rebound after stimulus offset will be larger after
attending to action than after attending to colour.
Examination of Figure 7 reveals just such a
pattern of inhibitory rebound. Note that at the
end of the trial (e.g., time period 12), the system
rebounds back into the mu rhythm, but this
rebound is larger after attending to action than
after attending to colour. Such a result provides a
glimpse of the inhibitory processes involved in con-
trolling behaviour during action simulation and
also conﬁrms that attention does play a role in
such action simulation processes. Other studies
examining simulation of emotional expression via
recording electromyographic (EMG) responses
from face muscles associated with smiling (zygo-
maticus) and frowning (corrugator) conﬁrmed
that action is simulated even when ignored and
that inhibition plays a role in the selection pro-
cesses (Cannon et al., 2009).
Finally, a further converging approach
attempted to investigate inhibitory control pro-
cesses during action simulation. Although it is
clear that basic actions, such as reach to grasp or
eye-movements (see below), are simulated when
we observe another person, there are also impor-
tant selection mechanisms that determine which
actions are produced by another person. As noted
above, inhibition is critical for controlling our
actions for successful achievement of goals. We
examined whether there was any evidence for the
internal representation/simulation of another
person’s inhibitory action selection processes
(Schuch & Tipper, 2007).
A stop-signal task (e.g., Logan & Cowan, 1984)
was employed because the inhibition of action is
very salient to a viewer. In a typical procedure a
visual stimulus is presented, and participants
depress a response key as fast as possible.
However, on some trials a stop-signal is presented,
requiring participants to stop the action. The stop-
signal could be a tone, or perhaps a change of
colour or size, as in our studies. In such studies
there are carry-over effects from one trial to
another. That is, after an action is successfully
stopped, response on the next go trial is slowed,
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FROM OBSERVATION TO ACTION SIMULATIONand the ability to successfully stop an action is
improved. This is assumed to reﬂect carry-over
effects of prior inhibition (e.g., Rieger &
Gauggel, 1999) as in tasks such as negative
priming (e.g., Tipper, 1985).
In our study two people sat next to each other
and participated in a stop-signal task. Stimuli
were presented on a computer screen, and partici-
pants responded to alternate trials by reaching
from a start location and depressing a response
key common to both of them. In this task we pro-
vided evidence for the simulation of another
person’s inhibitory control processes. That is,
after observing the other person successfully
inhibit their action, the participant was more
likely to fail to respond within the deadline for
response, as would be expected if the observed
inhibition were simulated.
A further study revealed that not only do we
simulate the inhibitory processes undertaken by
another person, but we can do so by taking their
viewpoint (Frischen, Loach, & Tipper, 2009). In
a selective reaching task participants were required
to reach towards target objects while ignoring
distractors. Inhibition associated with a competing
distractor can be revealed on the next trial where
response to a target, which was a previously
inhibited distractor, is impaired: This is negative
priming (see Figure 8, Panel a). The inhibition
associated with a distractor, as revealed via nega-
tive priming effects, is greater when it is closer to
the participant’s responding hand (see Figure 9,
Panel a). This egocentric hand-centred effect
emerges because objects closer to the hand win
the race for the control of action and hence
require greater levels of inhibition, as discussed
above in the reactive inhibition model.
We were interested to know whether the inhi-
bition required to select a target from a distractor
was simulated when observing someone else
make selective reaches. But more important, what
frame of reference is simulated? Consider Figure
8, Panel b. The agent reaches in the prime
display while being observed by the participant,
and then the participant reaches in the subsequent
probe display. If the simulated inhibition is
represented in an egocentric frame based on the
observing participant’s hand, then negative
priming would be larger in situations such as
Panel ii, where the observed distractor is close to
the participant’s hand, than in the situation
depicted in Panel i. That is, the negative priming
when observing another person undertake a reach
willbethesameaswhentheparticipantundertakes
the reach. In contrast, we hypothesized that
simulation processes are more sophisticated.
Participants are computing the task undertaken
by the other person, where greater inhibition will
be evoked when a distractor is closer to the
observed agent’s hand. That is, greater negative
priming will be evoked in situations depicted in
Paneli,wherethedistractorisclosetotheobserved
agent’s hand, than in Panel ii. Figure 9, Panel b
clearly supports the latter hypothesis, where nega-
tive priming is greater for a distractor far from the
viewing participant’s hand than when near,
contrasting with situations where the participant
produces both prime and probe responses (Figure 9,
Panel a).
It is also noteworthy that we have recently
observed a further boundary condition for such
effects. When observing another person reach
around an irrelevant distracting object, this
primes the participant’s own action only if the
observed action is in the peripersonal/action
space of the participant. That is, priming effects
are only produced if the observed distractor is a
potential distractor for the participant. If the
observed action is outside the peripersonal/action
space of the observing participant, no effects are
produced (Grifﬁths & Tipper, 2009). Thus,
when a participant observes the selective reaching
actions of another person, two frames of reference
inﬂuence action simulation. First, the observed
person’s selective reaching action is encoded from
their action-centred perspective; but second, this
only takes place if the action is within the
peripersonal action space of the observer: a subtle
interaction between the observed agent’s and
the participant’s frame-of-reference.
In the studies reviewed above, attention inﬂu-
ences the automatic conversion from vision to
action, with inhibitory control processes being of
particular importance. However, there is evidence
2090 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2010, 63 (11)
TIPPERFigure 8. Selective reaching task: Panel (a) represents the single person condition, illustrating the relationship between prime and subsequent
probe responses in the ignored repetition condition (i) and the control condition (ii). Negative priming is revealed in longer reaction times in
ignored repetition thanin control trials. Panel(b) shows examples of ignored repetition trials in the dual person condition. The participant (P)
observes the agent (A) perform the prime reach and then executes the probe reach. In (i), the salience of the prime distractor in the far-left
location is high in terms of the agent’s (allocentric) frame of reference, but low in terms of the participant’s own (egocentric) frame of
reference. In (ii), prime distractor salience (near-right location) is low in terms of the agent’s frame of reference, but high in terms of the
participant’s egocentric frame of reference.
Figure 9. Reaction time data representing the amount of negative priming (ignored repetition minus control; in ms) at each stimulus location
in (a) the single person task and (b) the dual person task. Stimulus locations (near/right/far/left) correspond to the participant’s frame of
reference whose hand is positioned at the start point at the front of the display.
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back and inﬂuence attention processes. In a further
study, to search for this opposite data pattern,
where action affordances facilitate attentional
processes, we examined 2 patients with right
parietal lesions resulting in visual extinction (di
Pellegrino, Rafal, & Tipper, 2005).
Patientswiththisdisordermaydetectastimulus
ineitherthe left or the right visual ﬁeld aslongasit
is presented alone. However, when two stimuli are
presented, one to the left and one to the right, the
patient typically fails to report the one in the ﬁeld
contralateral to the lesion, in our case in the left
visual ﬁeld after right parietal lesions. Thus extinc-
tion entails an abnormal bias in visual attention in
favour of ipsilesional right-side stimuli, with a
failure to direct attention to contralateral left side
of space. The idea tested was that if observing a
handle, for example, automatically primes the
motor programmes for its reaching and grasping
within a perceiver, could such processes trigger
orienting of attention to the site of the action (cf.
Eimer, Forster, Van Zelzen, & Prabhu, 2005)?
Cup stimuli were presented, and the patients
simply had to report their presence. As expected,
cups in the ipsilateral (right) visual ﬁeld were
always reported, whereas those in the contralateral
(left) ﬁeld were rarely reported during bilateral
presentation. However, this result did not hold
in one particular condition, and this is shown in
Figure 10, Panel A. In this situation the cup in
the contralateral (left) ﬁeld evoked a reaching-
and-grasp response from the left hand due to the
location of its handle to the left side of the cup.
This activation of motor response in the left
visual ﬁeld appears to have the effect of orienting
attention to that side of space, aiding detection
of the contralesional stimulus. Note that no such
effects were found in control conditions where
handles were replaced with patches equated for
position, size, and mean luminance (see Figure
10, Panel B).
Previous research has shown that explicit acti-
vation of motor-based representations can facilitate
orienting of attention to the contralateral ﬁeld. For
example, asking patients to move or prepare to
move the ﬁngers of their left hand (e.g., Robertson
& North, 1992) or asking them to search for an
object that evokes a particular action (e.g.,
Humphreys & Riddoch, 2001) improves detection
of stimuli presented towards the impaired region of
space. However, our results showed that the effects
of action on attention can be implicit and automatic,
inthatpatientssimplyreportedthepresenceofvisual
objects with a verbal response with no overt hand
responses, and action-related information such as
the location of a handle was irrelevant to their task.
Nevertheless, even in these circumstances the
action evoked by the handle was automatically
encoded and shifted attention despite extensive
damage to the right parietal lobule. That action-
related information can be extracted by the visual
system, even though it is unavailable for conscious
report, implies that right inferior parietal cortex
Figure 10. Patients with visual neglect were required to report the presence of single and dual object displays, on “left”, “right”, or “both” sides.
Typicallydetection of the cup on the left was poor when there was also a cup on the right. This was true except for the condition shown in Panel
A, where left cup detection was signiﬁcantly improved. In contrast, detection of the left cup remained poor in the stimulus control condition
shown in Panel B.
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automatic computation of vision to action.
In sum, there are two key properties of the
vision-to-action processing system. First, it seems
clear that when one is viewing an object that
affords an action, or another person undertaking
an action, the motor system of the observer is acti-
vated. Thus, the action of grasping a coffee cup is
evoked by one simply viewing a coffee cup, and
actions such askicking a ball or typing are triggered
when we see another person produce those actions.
Furthermore, such evoked actions appear to attract
attention and can facilitate detection of objects to
the neglected side of space after parietal lesions.
Such action simulation processes take place even
though the participant has no intentions of produ-
cing similar actions. Second, even though the
vision-to-action processes are automatic, attention
nevertheless can play a role in these processes in
some circumstances, increasing or decreasing acti-
vation states. In particular, attentional control pro-
cesses are critical for enabling only appropriate
behaviours to be produced, and we provide some
evidence for the role of inhibition in preventing
the overt modelling of viewed actions.
Furthermore, observation of another individual
controlling behaviour by inhibiting actions results
in the simulation of such inhibition processes in
the observer.
Eye-gaze and attention
In the discussion above it was argued that one
mechanism for understanding another person’s
actions and emotions was by simulating these
actions. For example, activation of the same
motor representations of another person might
enable an intimate understanding of them by
sharing their experiences. However, when interact-
ing with other people it is important not only to be
able to understand what they are currently doing
and feeling, but also to be able to encode their
current focus of attention, which might predict
future actions. Hence, as with the simulation of
body actions and emotions, there is also evidence
for the simulation of another person’s gaze direc-
tion. Thus, consider Figure 11, Panel A: When
Figure11. PanelA showsan exampleof a leftwardgazecue. In such
studies gaze would also be oriented to the right on 50% of the trials,
and there was no relationship between the direction of gaze and the
position of the asterisk target to be localized/detected. Panel B
demonstrates peripheral/exogenous cueing. The task requires
participants to detect the target X as fast as possible while
ignoring the brief ﬂicker of the box, which is the peripheral cue.
The cue automatically orients attention, facilitating target
processing at the attended location. However, after 300 ms this
facilitation effect reverts to inhibition, where target detection is
impaired at the cued location. Panel C represents an example of a
face display employed to investigate head-centred gaze cueing.
Typically targets are detected faster in the left than in the right
side of the display in this situation. In this example, the face is
oriented 908 anticlockwise from the upright; in other displays the
face was oriented 908 clockwise from the upright, and the eyes
gazed up and down equally often. To view a colour version of this
ﬁgure, please see the online issue of the Journal.
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the same location; in this case we rapidly orient to
the left. Hence, when required to detect or identify
a target, participants are faster when the target is
presented to the left than to the right in this situ-
ation. This attention shift is a fast and automatic
process in that even when instructed that future
targets are more likely to be presented to the side
of space opposite to the direction of gaze, attention
nevertheless initially follows the gaze direction
(e.g., Driver et al., 1999).
Following the direction of another person’s
gaze is an example of joint attention, which has
been found to emerge as early as 3 months (e.g.,
Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998) and which is
seen as an important step towards establishing
social interactions (e.g., Moore & Dunham,
1995). The orientation of attention based on
observed gaze direction is thought to reﬂect the
activation of neural systems such as the superior
temporal sulcus (STS) dedicated to decoding
social stimuli (e.g., Perrett et al., 1985, for evi-
dence from monkeys; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000,
for humans), and the STS interacts with areas
involved in orienting of attention such as the
intraparietal sulcus (IPS).
There has now been a substantial amount of
research investigating attention orienting evoked
by perceived gaze shifts (see Frischen, Bayliss, &
Tipper, 2007a, for review). Here I want to brieﬂy
comment on some studies that have further exam-
ined the attention processes activated when a gaze
shift is observed. Although gaze cueing has social
properties, which are reﬂected in, for example,
interactions between gaze and face emotion and
the effects of individual differences (e.g., Fox,
Mathews, Calder, & Yiend, 2007, and see discus-
sions below), in other ways gaze cueing of attention
is similar to other forms of attention cueing. For
example, as noted, a gaze cue triggers a fast and
automatic orienting of attention to the gazed at
location. This is similar to the effects of peripheral
sudden onset cues. That is, when a cue is ﬂashed in
the periphery,targetspresented atthecued location
aredetectedfasterthanattheoppositesideofspace,
and these facilitation effects can be detected within
100 ms of cue onset (see Figure 11, Panel B).
However, at longer cue–target intervals there is
a dramatic difference between gaze and sudden
onset cues. For the former gaze cues, the facilita-
tive effects decline, such that by 1,000 ms there
is no evidence for any cueing effect. In sharp con-
trast, at cue–target intervals longer than 300 ms
peripheral cues produce an inhibition effect that
lasts for at least 3 s and perhaps much longer
(e.g., Tipper, Grison, & Kessler, 2003). This is
known as inhibition of return (IOR) and is
assumed to be a mechanism that prevents attention
continuously orienting to a previously attended
location, to facilitate search of the environment,
as when foraging for food, for example (Posner
& Cohen, 1984).
Because gaze cueing effects can no longer be
detected by around 1,000 ms after the gaze shift,
it was assumed that gaze cues do not evoke inhi-
bition of return. However, we proposed that
because of the social relevance of gaze shifts,
there might be a delay in the onset of inhibition.
That is, in contrast to the meaningless sudden
onset peripheral cues often used to orient atten-
tion, human gaze shifts usually carry meaning.
For example, during a social interaction, if a
person suddenly breaks eye contact and looks to
the periphery, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
some interesting/important information has cap-
tured their attention, or, more importantly, that
some event of interest is about to happen. In
such a situation it may not be wise to rapidly
inhibit information from that location after a
brief attention shift to it.
We therefore tested gaze cueing effects at much
longer intervals than previously investigated. That
is, we varied the interval between cue and target
from 200 to 1,200 to 2,400 ms. At the shorter
intervals we replicated the usual ﬁnding of facili-
tation of target processing at the gazed-at location
at 200 ms, but no cueing effects at 1,200 ms. But of
most importance we detected IOR for the ﬁrst
time when the cue–target interval was 2,400 ms
(Frischen & Tipper, 2004). In general it appears
that gaze and peripheral cues can produce similar
patterns of excitation followed by inhibition.
However, in the case of gaze cues the period of
initial excitation is prolonged, and there is a
2094 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2010, 63 (11)
TIPPERdelay in the emergence of inhibition (see also
Frischen, Smilek, Eastwood, & Tipper, 2007b,
for further boundary conditions).
Further studies examined whether social gaze
cues have other properties in common with other
forms of attention orienting. Previous work has
shown that attention can be object based, where
processes of excitation and inhibition are not just
directed to spatial location, but can be associated
with objects (e.g., Tipper, Brehaut, & Driver,
1990; Tipper, Driver, & Weaver, 1991). For
example, Tipper, Weaver, Jerreat, and Burak
(1994) showed that IOR could be associated with
both a location cued and with a moving object.
That is, people are slower to process an object
they have recently attended to, even if it has
moved to a new location. Therefore we examined
whether gaze cueing could also result in multiple
frames of reference, where attention could be
shifted in spatial- and head-centred frames.
Consider the face display shown in Figure 11,
Panel C. When asked the somewhat odd question,
“Is this person looking to the right or left?”, many
people tend to report “left” in this forced-choice
situation. This suggests that when encoding a
face that is not in its normal orientation there is
an automatic orientation to the normal upright
view, and in this situation this face would indeed
be looking left. That is, there is a form of momen-
tum where it is assumed the face will not remain in
the unusual orientation, but will shortly return to
the normal upright position. Eye-gaze cueing
studies have conﬁrmed this anecdotal observation.
Thus in this condition target detection is indeed
slightly faster to the left than to the right side of
the display. This supports the notion that gaze
cueing is head centred (Bayliss, di Pellegrino, &
Tipper, 2004). Of course, we also measured
location-based gaze cueing in this situation and
showed that target detection was also faster in
the lower looked-at than the upper ignored
location (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006a).
An issue that has to be considered concerns the
relationship between experimental effects we inter-
pret as due to attention processes and the inﬂuence
of memory on these processes (e.g., Tipper, 2001).
One proposal has been that attention states, such as
inhibition, can be encoded into memory and
retrieved at a later point in time (e.g., Kessler &
Tipper, 2004; Tipper et al., 2003). This notion of
retrieval of prior processes of attention has now
been extended to gaze cueing. When another
person makes a gaze shift, we have argued that
this evokes similar processes in the observer, such
that their attention moves to the same location.
Frischen and Tipper (2006) demonstrated that
such attention states can be retrieved from
memory in some circumstances. That is, they
showed that after viewing an image of a famous
person making a gaze shift to the left or right,
when that face was encountered 3 minutes later
staring straight ahead, attention shifted to the
location they were looking at 3 minutes earlier.
Although limited to somewhat speciﬁc
circumstances (see Frischen & Tipper, 2006, for
details), it appears not only that we simulate
another person’s attentional states, but these are
encoded in memory and can be retrieved when
the person is next encountered, possibly inﬂuen-
cing how we perceive the person, as discussed
below.
As noted, gaze direction is an important social
cue, as it is key to understanding the intentions
of other people. That encoding another person’s
gaze shifts is important for social interactions is
supported by the ﬁnding that the development of
joint attention from gaze cues at 20 months can
predict language development and theory of mind
abilities at 44 months (Charman et al., 2001).
We have shown that the properties of the gaze
cueing attention system are similar to those of
other attention systems, where IOR, multiple
frames of reference, and retrieval from memory
have been demonstrated. In particular, that
another person’s motor states are simulated, and
such simulations can be retrieved from memory,
has implications for emotion and person percep-
tion as discussed below.
Action simulation evokes emotion
It is clear that observation of another person’s
actions such as reaching and grasping (di
Pellegrino et al., 1992) and gaze shifts (e.g.,
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cesses in the viewer. The same neural systems
appear to be involved in producing particular
actions and in perceiving those actions. That our
body states can be involved in interpreting the
world, especially in understanding other people,
reﬂects embodied or grounded accounts of social
cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 2003; Glenberg, 1997).
Such a theory makes speciﬁc predictions about
emotional responses and interpretations of
complex social stimuli, emerging from the bodily
states of a person. This is especially the case for
emotional responses, as the following examples
make clear (see Niedenthal, 2007, for review).
Stepper and Strack (1993) required participants to
maintain either an upright posture with the
shoulders held back, or a slumped posture. When
given the good news that they succeeded in an
earlier test, those in the slumped posture felt less
proud and reported more negative feelings such
that it was not their achievement, but rather the
test was easy. Similarly, when participants were
requiredtoholdapenbetweentheteeth,producing
activation of the muscles associated with smiling
(zygomaticus), they reported that jokes were
funnier than when holding the pen between the
lips, which inhibits smiling (Strack, Martin, &
Stepper, 1988). Hence, as argued above, the state
of one’s body can inﬂuence the interpretation of
one’s own behaviour and objects in the
environment.
We have investigated the role of body states,
especially those determined by simulation of
other people’s actions, in a number of ways. It
has been established that emotion can affect atten-
tion. That is, the emotional property of a stimulus
can inﬂuence attention orienting. Thus a negative
target stimulus in an array of distractors is
detected faster than a neutral or positive stimulus,
presumably reﬂecting fast preattentive encoding
of emotion by the amygdala (e.g., Fenske &
Eastwood, 2003; Fox et al., 2000). However, we
have been investigating the opposite relationship
where the attention processes of a person, which
are activated when observing another individual,
can inﬂuence how they feel about objects or
other people.
For example, gaze direction tends to reﬂect
emotion. That is, gaze tends to settle on objects
that we decide we like (e.g., Shimojo, Simion,
Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). Thus we wondered
whether, as well as observed gaze shifts triggering
shifts of attention in the viewer, there was also
simulation of the emotional responses they might
trigger, and that these emotions may leave a
trace in memory. Therefore, we tested whether
the gaze shifts of other people, even though irrele-
vant to ongoing behaviour, might be internalized
and produce emotional reactions in the viewer,
and that these emotions might inﬂuence assess-
ment of objects at a later point in time. In one
study faces were presented to the centre of the
display, and the eyes shifted to look left or right.
The participant’s task was to identify a single
everyday target object (e.g., kettle) presented to
the left or right of the central face. However, unbe-
known to the participant we manipulated the
relationship between the direction of gaze and
object to be classiﬁed. Participants classiﬁed two
examples of each type of object, such as a green
kettle and a red kettle, and throughout the exper-
iment gaze was always oriented to one of the
kettles (e.g., red) and on other trials always away
from the other kettle (e.g., green).
Typical cueing effects were observed, conﬁrm-
ing no explicit awareness of gaze–object contin-
gencies. However, in a later test where we
presented the pairs of objects and asked which
was preferred, there was a tendency to select the
object that had been looked at by other individuals
throughout the study (Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, &
Tipper, 2006). A further study showed that this
preference effect interacted with the emotion of
the face viewing the object. If the face was
smiling, then objects repeatedly looked at were
preferred over those looked away from. In contrast,
if the face expressed disgust, then the object looked
at was not preferred relative to the one where
gaze consistently looked away from it (Bayliss,
Frischen, Fenske, & Tipper, 2007). Critically,
these effects on liking are not produced when an
arrow predictably orients attention towards
certain objects. Therefore, it appears as if the
effect emerges from a simulation of the preferences
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effect of attention on speed of processing.
Further work extended the idea that simulation
of other peoples’ actions can inﬂuence the
emotional response to objects in the environment.
As noted above, for survival in complex and
dangerous environments, information able to
guide action has to be extracted rapidly from the
visual array. Actions that are a few milliseconds
too slow, or a few millimetres in error, could
result in death when ﬂeeing a predator, for
example. Given that conversion from vision to
action is fundamental to survival, the ﬂuency of
such processes might evoke emotional responses,
possibly mediated by dopamine networks.
Therefore we investigated whether the simulation
of others’ actions might involve the ﬂuency/ease
of the action undertaken by another person, and
the simulation of such actions might also evoke
an emotional response in the observer that is
similar to when an action is produced ﬂuently
(Hayes, Paul, Beuger, & Tipper, 2008).
In a ﬁrst study we wanted to demonstrate that
ﬂuent/easy actions do indeed result in greater
liking of the object acted upon, as embodied or
grounded accounts of cognitive processes would
predict. The task simply required participants to
pick up an everyday consumer product, such as a
jar of coffee, and move it to a different location.
Two conditions were examined. In the ﬁrst, (see
Figure 12, Panel B on the right) the reach was dif-
ﬁcult in the sense that the object had to be moved
around and placed behind anobstacle. The obstacle
was a thin glass vase containing water, so a cautious
reach was required. In the second condition, the
reach was easier (see Panel A on the left of
Figure 12), where no obstacle had to be avoided.
Once the object was placed on the table, partici-
pants rated it for liking on a 9-point scale.
The ﬂuency of this very simple motor task did
inﬂuence how people felt about the object they
had interacted with. Those objects in the more dif-
ﬁcult obstacle avoidance condition were generally
liked less than those in the easier no obstacle con-
dition. Therefore ﬂuency of action can have effects
on emotion, where motor ﬂuency is associated with
the object acted upon, and participants like the
object more. The critical question was, of course,
what happened when such actions were merely
observed, and participants made no motor
responses throughout the experiment? In this
new task video clips of the reaches shown in
Figure 12 were presented, and participants simply
sat passively observing the clip and gave liking
ratings after the object was placed back on to the
table. Therefore any effects on the liking of an
object must be due to simulation of observed
actions. We found that just as when actually
moving objects around, people prefer objects after
a simple action has been performed on them.
Therefore this suggests that not only is action
simulated when it is observed, but also the
emotional effects of ﬂuent action are simulated.
Finally we also considered the critical impor-
tance of gaze direction in these studies. As noted
above, observing another person merely looking
towards an object can inﬂuence how a participant
feels about the object (e.g., Bayliss et al., 2006).
In the current studies we also found that the
action ﬂuency manipulation only inﬂuenced a
person’s liking rating of the viewed object if the
person’s face in the video clip was visible. There
were two effects: First, when the person was not
seen to be looking towards the grasped objects,
overall liking of objects was signiﬁcantly less than
when gaze towards the object was visible, conﬁrm-
ing previous results. Second, when gaze was not
visible, the contrast between ﬂuent and nonﬂuent
actions was no longer detected. Such ﬁndings are
in line with single unit recording studies of
Jellema, Baker, Wicker, and Perrett (2000). They
found a population of cells in STS that responded
when a particular reach-to-grasp action was
viewed, but only when the individual producing
the action was seen to look towards the action.
Note also that in our conditions of visible or
occluded eye-gaze the reach-to-grasp actions are
identical, and hence preference effects for ﬂuent
and nonﬂuent actions are not caused only by
some basic visual properties of the action—the
actor’s attention and intention is also critical.
We also investigated whether the viewpoint of
an action could inﬂuence emotional responses.
Therefore we presented images similar to those
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moved. In this case, however, we compared ﬁrst-
person egocentric views (Figure 13) with third-
person allocentric views (Figure 12). Previous
work has shown that when actions are viewed
from an egocentric ﬁrst-person perspective
subsequent imitation is faster and more accurate,
indicating that the visual properties of the move-
ments can be transformed into one’s own action
more ﬂuently (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety
2006). But even more interestingly, there is
evidence that viewing actions from a ﬁrst-person
perspective activates different brain areas,
especially those involved in the perception of
bodily states and those involved in emotional
processing. That is, in contrasting ﬁrst- versus
third-person views of action, David et al. (2006)
showed greater activation in midline structures
such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and
orbitofrontal cortex, areas thought to be core
components for the sense of self as well as cingu-
late cortex and the posterior insula associated
with monitoring states of the body. They also
observed greater activity when viewing ﬁrst-
person action in limbic structures such as the
amygdala—areas associated with emotional
encoding of stimuli.
Therefore we predicted that when viewing
actions from a ﬁrst-person perspective there would
be more activation of emotion centres in the brain,
Figure 12. Frames from video displays employed to study simulation of emotion emerging from action ﬂuency. Panel A shows an easy reach
where no obstacle has to be avoided. Panel B shows a difﬁcult reach where the object has to be moved around and placed behind a fragile object.
After viewing such displays participants tended to prefer objects after easy reaches were observed (Panel A), but only if the face gazing towards
the action was visible. To view a colour version of this ﬁgure, please see the online issue of the Journal.
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doing the action, and a greater sense of ﬂuency.
We hypothesized that such processes would result
in more ease during such action observation, and
perhaps such positive affect would be associated
with the manipulated object. Just such effects were
indeed observed. People consistently reported that
when viewing actions, they preferred objects that
were manipulated from a ﬁrst-person egocentric
perspective more than those manipulated from a
third-person allocentric viewpoint. This further
supports the idea that body states activated by
merely observing a visual object being manipulated
can feed back on to the object viewed, inﬂuencing
how a person feels about the object.
It is noteworthythat our measures ofemotion in
the studies described above were explicit. That is,
participants were required to think about how
they felt about objects or people and attempt to
provide a number from a scale that reﬂects their
emotional feelings. This of course is a somewhat
artiﬁcial situation, as we do not respond in such a
controlled and conscious manner when we typically
interact with our everyday environment. Rather,
many of our emotional reactions are not carefully
scrutinized, but guide our behaviour towards and
away from objects and situations in an implicit
manner.
Therefore we reexamined situations with differ-
ent visuomotor ﬂuency, but now used implicit/
nonconscious measures of liking. Thus we
employed electromyography (EMG) to record
from the zygomaticus and corrugator face
muscles (Cannon, Hayes, & Tipper, in press). As
noted before, these muscles reﬂect our emotions,
with greater activity in the zygomaticus cheek
muscle associated with smiling when we are
viewing someone else smiling, or when perceptual
processing is more ﬂuent (e.g., Winkielman &
Cacioppo, 2001). Thus recording of facial
muscles enables us to detect a person’s subtle
emotional reactions. We found similar effects
during vision-to-action processing depending on
the ﬂuency/ease of the action. That is, when
actions were a little faster and more accurate the
zygomaticus muscle became more active, reﬂecting
the participant’s positive emotional reaction to
such action ﬂuency. This was an implicit measure
of emotion, as at no time during the recording of
the EMGs were participants ever asked to consider
their feelings towards objects that they viewed.
In sum, these studies show that positive affect
can be evoked when one is interacting with
objects, or when merely observing another person
interact with an object, and this can be detected
with explicit conscious reports and with implicit
nonconscious EMG measures. The emotional
response emerging from a body state, in this case
action ﬂuency, may be the mechanism by which
long-term preferences emerge. Thus, the emotion
evoked by action ﬂuency informs the actor about
the environment and reinforces ﬂuent action and
the selection of objects that aid ﬂuent action.
Finally, the emotion effects of viewing action
only emerge when the actor is seen to look at the
object, supporting the notion that shared attention
between the actor and observer is a necessary
requirement for actions to be simulated and for
empathic states between people to be achieved.
Action simulation and person perception
In the studies just described, simulation of another
person’s actions, such as their direction of gaze/
attention, or the ﬂuency of their actions, inﬂuences
Figure 13. A frame from a video showing reaches from an egocentric
perspective.We found that objects were liked more when participants
viewed actions from this egocentric perspective than from the
allocentric third-person view described in Figure 12. To view a
colour version of this ﬁgure, please see the online issue of the Journal.
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However, we also wanted to investigate whether
such simulation processes could also inﬂuence
how people interpret other people. That is, could
personal traits such as trustworthiness, or inter-
ests/skills, be inﬂuenced via action observation
and the resulting internal simulations?
To examine trust we again manipulated prob-
ability of gaze cueing. However, unlike the
studies above, which manipulated whether par-
ticular objects were always looked at or always
ignored, we now manipulated whether a particular
person always looked towards or always looked
away from targets in the visual ﬁeld (Bayliss &
Tipper, 2006b). Even though gaze direction is
highly predictive of another person’s point of
interest, and hence extremely valuable during
social interactions, gaze direction can also be
used to deceive (e.g., Emery, 2000). For example,
an individual wishing to hide from another
person something of value, such as food, would
tend to look away from the point of interest.
In our experiment there were three sets of faces.
In the 50/50 group, each face gazed towards or
away from to-be-identiﬁed target objects equally
often. This is the standard procedure employed
in gaze cueing studies. In a second group, each
face always looked towards targets over 12 presen-
tations; this was the predictive group. And in the
third group of faces, the individuals never looked
towards targets, always looking in the opposite
direction across 12 exposures, and this was the
nonpredictive group.
Surprisingly, in terms of cueing, whether faces
always looked towards or always looked away
from targets made absolutely no difference, as
the cueing effects were the same as those typically
found with 50/50 faces. Furthermore, not only
were attention shifts unaffected by gaze prob-
ability, but participants were also unaware that
the faces differed when questioned in a debrieﬁng
session. Hence it would appear that we are
insensitive to whether another person was reliable
and always looked towards targets and hence aided
our behaviour, or whether a person always looked
away from targets, orienting our attention in the
wrong direction. However, when we presented
pairs of faces, such that one had always looked to
targets, and the other never had, and then asked
who was more trustworthy, participants tended
to select the face that had looked at targets.
Interestingly, in a follow-on study we did not
initially replicate this effect, but then discovered
that the detection of a person’s trustworthiness
only seems to take place when they are smiling,
rather than expressing a negative or neutral
emotion (Bayliss, Grifﬁths, & Tipper, 2009). It
may be the case that in the context of friendly
smiling faces, breaking of social norms when
looking away from objects is a more salient cue
to deception. Certainly a person attempting to
deceive another is more likely to smile to encou-
rage trust (consider the second-hand car sales-
man); hence sensitivity to cues to trust would
need to be high, relative to an explicitly hostile
encounter when viewing an angry person.
Furthermore, this latter result would tend to rule
out more general associative effects, where, for
example, arrows of a particular colour that always
pointed to targets would be “trusted” more. That
an individual’s emotion can alter the cueing/trust
effect supports the role of gaze perception in soph-
isticated and complex social interactions.
Finally we wanted to further test predictions
that emerge from embodied accountsof perception
and action and extend the results from trust-
worthiness to other personal traits. That is, could
the ﬂuency of the visual–motor processing states
of a person inﬂuence how they interpret another
person’s personal attributes/interests? In other
words, can one’s own body state be misattributed
to that of another person? A version of the task
described in Figure 5 was used. However, in this
situation no colour patches were presented, and
the actions were shown as short video clips
rather than static images. Participants were
required to identify the two individuals “George”
and “John” with either a foot or a ﬁnger response.
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment we replicated
motor compatibility effects. Thus, when partici-
pants were identifying George with a foot
response, responses were faster and more accurate
when a video of George kicking a ball was viewed
than of him typing on a keyboard. Of course the
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pants were identifying him with a ﬁnger key-press,
responses were faster and more accurate when he
was viewed typing than when kicking a ball.
However, the next stage of the study was more
important. Faces of George and John were pre-
sented, and participants were required to rate
how sporty or academic they felt each person
was. We discovered that the participant’s motor
ﬂuency while identifying George and John in the
ﬁrst part of the experiment determined what kind
of people they subsequently felt George and John
were. That is, if George was more ﬂuently ident-
iﬁed with a foot response while he was kicking a
ball and more slowly with greater errors when
seen typing, George was considered to be a
sporty rather than academic person. For John the
opposite personal-trait assignments were produced
(Bach & Tipper, 2007).
Not only were these personal-trait effects
observed with explicit decisions when participants
were rating George and John on sporty/academic
scales, but they were also detected with implicit
measures in a priming study where participants
were never asked to explicitly rate George and
John. Further studies by Tipper and Bach (2008)
demonstrated that the effects were not determined
by association of motor responses with personal
traits, such as foot responses associated with sport
(kicking, running, jumping, etc.) and ﬁnger
responses more associated with academic pursuits
(typing, writing, etc.). And ﬁnally, the effect
required observation of the person actually produ-
cing the actions of kicking or typing in a video clip,
as static images of single action frames did not
produce the personal-trait effects.
Therefore these experiments show that the
effects of observing another person’s behaviours
can go in two directions. Initially there is
simulation of the motor processes that another
person is undertaking. When we see them kick
the ball, our own motor responses for such an
action become active, facilitating foot responses.
However,themotorstatesactivatedintheperceiver
are in turn used to interpret the actions of the
person viewed: If our action is more ﬂuid and
efﬁcient, we perceive the other person to be better
at what they are currently doing. Evidence that
our own body states inﬂuence how we perceive
the world support embodiment accounts of cogni-
tive processes (e.g., Barsalou, 2003).
CONCLUSION
This paper has reviewed a range of studies that
my colleagues and I have undertaken over recent
years. The central focus has been to investigate
the processes that convert visual information
into action-based representations—in particular
the situations where people encounter objects
associated with action: that is, objects a person
typically acts on, such as grasping and drinking
from a cup, and the actions that other people
produce. Understanding how these stimuli are
processed is crucial for basic core interactions
with our inanimate world, but is also key to our
understanding of other people and hence our
human ability to thrive within social groups.
A key focus of the research programme has been
to investigate the role of attention in these
processes. It appears that conversion from vision
to action is automatic in the sense that it takes
place even when a person has no intention to
produce an action, but nevertheless attention
plays an important role. That is, when attending
to an action, stronger action-based representations
are activated, and, second, inhibitory processes play
an important role in controlling overt behaviour
while viewing action-evoking objects or other
people’s actions. Clearly the most obvious place
where attention is key to action understanding is
in terms of gaze shifts. Actually observing
someone else’s behaviour, such as a sudden look
to the left, automatically triggers a shift of
attention to the same location in the viewer. Our
studies show that these gaze attention systems
have similar properties to other attention systems,
such as evoking IOR, but interestingly they also
have unique properties such as evoking emotional
reactions to objects looked towards, or emotional
responses (e.g., trust) to the person seen to make
the gaze shift. These and other results support
the notion of embodied representations mediating
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viewing visual stimuli, and these body states
are in turn used to interpret our visual world
containing objects and people.
Future work should investigate the interactions
between action encoding regions such as the STS
and its interactions with brain areas involved in
emotional encoding such as the amygdala and
the orbitofrontal cortex. It is possible that
emotional responses evoked during visuomotor
processes are key to whether body states inﬂuence
perception. That is, it is not just more ﬂuent visuo-
motor processing that makes us like an object
more, trust a person more, or believe a person
has particular traits. Rather, I hypothesise that
only if a positive emotion is evoked by ﬂuent
visuomotor processes are such effects obtained.
Techniques such as EMG to directly monitor
emotion onlinewillconﬁrmthat emotion mediates
many of the effects described in this paper.
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